Rules Pertaining to Witnesses by Reed, John W.
University of Michigan Law School 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository 
Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship 
1978 
Rules Pertaining to Witnesses 
John W. Reed 
University of Michigan Law School, reedj@umich.edu 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/book_chapters/31 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/book_chapters 
 Part of the Evidence Commons, Litigation Commons, and the State and Local Government Law 
Commons 
Publication Information & Recommended Citation 
Reed, John W. "Rules Pertaining to Witnesses." In The Michigan Rules of Evidence: A Practice Manual, 
edited by R. B. Baxter et al. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Institute of Continuing Legal Education, 1978. 
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan 
Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Book Chapters by an authorized 
administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
Rules Pertaining to Witnesses 
John w. Reed 
Article VI of the Michigan Rules of Evidence con-
tains the rules dealing with witnesses. Trials bring to 
mind testimonial evidence. There surely are other kinds 
of evidence, such as docmnents, guns, automobile tires, 
chemical substances, and the like. But most evidence 
comes from the mouths of witnesses, and even demonstra-
tive evidence usually is admitted only after a witness 
has taken the stand and testified to foundation facts. 
So it is important and appropriate that we turn to the 
provisions of the rules that deal with qualifications 
and credibility of witnesses. 
I would like to direct your attention to MRE 601 and 
603, dealing with the competency of witnesses, and 
MRE 602, dealing with the requirement of personal 
knowledge. There are affirmative and negative aspects 
of competency. On the affirmative side, there are two 
requirements. First, Rule 601 requires the physical and 
mental capacity: one must have had sight to testify to 
what was seen or hearing to testify to what was heard; 
the ability to remember what was perceived by these or 
the other senses; and the ability to communicate under-
standably what is remembered. In brief, the important 
mental and physiological factors are the abilities to 
observe, remember, and communicate. The second affir-
mative element of competency, stated in Rule 603, is 
that the person must be willing to commit himself to 
try to tell the truth. In essence it is a moral quali-
fication. 
In addition to these affirmative factors, there may 
be negative fac_tors that would render incompetent an 
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otherwise competent witness. For example, in an earlier 
day a convicted felon was not competent as a witness 
even though he could observe, remember, and communicate 
and would promise to tell the truth on this occasion. If 
one were a party or the spouse of a party, one could not 
testify. Over the years these incompetencies have been 
modified, indeed largely eliminated. 
With one significant exception, Rules 601, 602, and 
603 simply restate prior Michigan law and practice, and 
for that matter, with that one significant exception, 
they restate the general law and practice in this 
regard. Let us look at some of the specific issues 
involved in these rules. 
The introductory clause of Michigan's Rule 601 
incorporates the affirmative aspects of competency. 
Incidentally, if a person cannot testify understand-
ably because he doesn't speak the language of the 
court, an interpreter is required. There is a slight 
change in Michigan practice with respect to interpret-
ers: under MRE 604 interpreters must be sworn and the 
court must find that the interpreter is an expert. 
Rule 603 states the familiar requirement that the 
witness take an oath. The form of the oath is not man-
dated; it may be in any form that the court will permit 
that is calculated to awaken the witness's conscience 
and impress on him or her the duty to testify truthful-
ly. Michigan probably does not have an exotic enough 
variety of cultures to give rise to the kinds of situ-
ations that may arise in places like New York or San 
Francisco. I remember hearing about a case in San 
Francisco involving a homicide that was the result of 
a so-called Tong war. A prospective witness of Chinese 
ancestry asked to be allowed to take his oath in the 
courtroom over the ringing of the neck of a white 
rooster. The symbolism is obvious. There are other 
oaths in the Far East where a person blows out a candle 
or breaks a cup in the courtroom. It is unlikely that 
you will encounter such things in Iron River, but the 
point is that the oath does not have to be "So help me, 
God." A judge should be willing to do whatever he or she 
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believes will extract from the witness an express ion of 
understanding the importance of telling the truth and a 
commitment to try to do so. 
With the witness on the stand having taken the oath, 
it is then up to the court to determine the witness's 
competence in the affirmative sense. Federal Rule 601 
suggests that any witness a lawyer would put on the 
witness stand has enough credibility to make it worth 
the jury's hearing him, with limitations of ability 
being a matter of weight and not of competence. The 
Michigan Supreme Court adopted a different version of 
Rule 601, which makes possible a determination by the 
court that a proposed witness is incompetent. Such a 
determination will be rare, of course-typically a very 
young child or the mentally ill or retarded person. 
We turn now to the negative aspects of competency. 
Michigan, like other states, has long since eliminated 
such grounds of incompetency as felony convict ions, 
marriage to a party, and interest in the outcome. The 
only important incompetency remaining appears in the 
Dead Man's Statute, which makes a survivor incompetent 
to testify to a transaction equally within the knowl-
edge of the deceased. But even that ground has been of 
relatively little importance since the 1967 amendment 
which made such testimony admissible if corroborated. 
Now, by virtue of Rule 601, the Dead Man's Statute is 
gone. MRE 601 states that every person is competent to 
be a witness "except as otherwise provided in these 
rules"-and there is no Dead Man's Statute in the 
rules. That is the only significant change in Michigan 
practice embodied in MRE 601 and 603. 
There are two other incompetencies defined in these 
rules, both unsurprising. MRE 605 provides that a judge 
cannot testify in a case in which he is presiding. MRE 
606 states that a juror cannot testify in a case 1n 
which he is sitting as a juror. No objection need be 
made to preserve either point. 
There is one other important aspect of witness 
qualification in Rule 602. A witness may be qualified 
physically and mentally and may be perfectly willing 
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to abide by an appropriate oath, but, according to Rule 
602, he can testify only to those matters about which he 
has personal knowledge. Moreover, evidence that he has 
such knowledge is a prerequisite, a necessary founda-
tion, to testimony about that matter. For example, a 
normally competent witness takes the usual oath and is 
asked, "Who ran the red light?" Not only is that bad 
advocacy, it violates Rule 602. (Indeed, very often the 
rules require, or at least encourage, practice that 
the principles of persuasive advocacy would dictate 
anyway.) Rule 602 requires that evidence be introduced 
"sufficient to support a finding that he has personal 
knowledge of the matter." There must be prima facie 
evidence that the witness has personal knowledge. An 
exception exists for the expert witness who may, for 
example, base his opinion on a hypothetical question. 
There is, of course, no difference between Rule 602 and 
previous Michigan practice. 
I turn next to impeachment. To impeach a witness is, 
in the traditional phrase, to detract from his cred-
ibility. The rules dealing with impeachment are not 
exhaustive; there are modes of impeachment not dealt 
with. For example, it is certainly permissible to show 
a witness's interest in the case, or his bias, yet there 
is no rule mentioning it. It is also permissible to 
show that the witness has made a prior inconsistent 
statement, but again there is no explicit reference in 
the rules to that as a legitimate means of impeachment. 
The rules do contain reference to the procedure for 
showing prior inconsistent statements, but there is no 
11 authorizing" provision. As adopted, the impeachment 
provisions of the MRE consist simply of a rule govern-
ing who may impeach and a series of rules giving 
guidance in frequently recurring and particularly 
troublesome areas, such as impeachment by character, by 
prior conduct, by prior convictions, and by religious 
belief. 
Under Rule 607 who may impeach? The traditional view 
is that one may not impeach one's own witness. The 
justifications for this are a combination of theory and 
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practicality. In theory, an attorney vouches for the 
credibility of the witness he presents and therefore 
cannot turn on the witness when his testimony is 
disappointing. However, the attorney does not always 
have a choice of who his witnesses are, particularly 
eyewitnesses to a tort. On the practical side, the 
suggest ion was that if the party who calls a witness can 
turn on his witness, there will be no one to protect 
that witness from attacks on his character and the 
1 ike. That is probably fallacious also. The court, 
among others, should protect the witness from improper 
attack. This traditional rule is widely criticized, 
and the federal rules responded to that criticism by 
permitting the impeachment of the witness by any party. 
The Michigan Supreme Court took the opposite view. 
MRE 607 essentially restates the prior traditional 
rules on the point. First, the opposing party may 
impeach; that is orthodox. Second, the calling party 
generally may not impeach his own witness. But he may 
impeach (a) if the prosecutor is obligated to call the 
witness, (b) if the witness is the opposite party, or 
(c) if a witness suprises and harms the calling party's 
case. Harm does not mean~ disappointment; it means 
evidence that goes against your case, that is "aff irma-
tively" contrary to what was anticipated. If the wit-
ness says, "I don't remember," that is not harm within 
the meaning of this rule. 
MRE 607 does not leave the Michigan trial lawyer 
totally without remedy against the disappointing 
witness. The rule in Hileman v Indreica, 385 Mich 1; 187 
NW2d 411 (1971), unaffected by MRE 607, states that an 
examining attorney may seek to refresh his witness's 
recollection by using prior statements of the witness. 
Thus, Hileman affords some help in dealing with the 
witness who surprises but does not harm or who harms 
but does not surprise. 
MRE 608 governs the use of character and conduct of a 
witness as bearing on his credibility. Essentially, it 
is a relevance problem. The fact that a person is deemed 
to be generally honest (or dishonest) may make it more 
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likely that he is (or is not) telling the truth this 
time. But the rules set rather tight limits on these 
kinds of proof. Relevance is a problem and there are 
other considerable costs and problems involved. How do 
we prove, in terms of character, that one is a truthful 
or untruthful person? The time required for this kind 
of pursuit may be excessive, and the possibility of 
misuse by the jury is substantial. The necessary 
limiting guidelines appear in MRE 608, which is similar 
to the corresponding federal rule. 
In the language of MRE 608(a) note the word 
"reputation." This is where the Michigan rule differs 
significantly from the federal rule. The federal rule 
allows proof of character either by reputation or by 
opm10n. The Michigan rule is more traditional and 
limits proof of character to reputation. The federal 
rule reflects the widely held feeling that even when 
testimony is couched in terms of reputation most 
witnesses (and most jurors) are thinking opinion; it is 
one witness's opinion of another witness. 
Recall the usual scenario: 
Q. Do you know witness A 1 s reputation for truth and 
veracity in the community in which he resides 
and works? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. What is that reputation? 
A. It is bad. He has a bad reputation. Everybody 
thinks he is a liar. 
One other question is allowed in order to see what he 
means by "bad": 
Q. Based on that reputation, would you believe him 
under oath? 
A. No, sir. 
That sounds like his opinion. Actually, the purpose 
of the question is to see how bad that reputation is-
perhaps so bad that he should not be believed under 
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oath. However, the general tenor is that of opinion 
evidence, in practice if not in theory. The reputation 
must be one for truthfulness or untruthfulness, not 
for being a good person, or a law-abiding person, or a 
peaceable person, or a moral person. 
A witness's credibility may not be defended until it 
has been attacked. One cannot put on Witness No. 1, have 
him testify, and then call Witness No. 2 to say, "Wit-
ness No. 1 has a great reputation for truthfulness." 
If the witness is attacked, however, then there may 
be supporting or rehabilitating testimony. Ordinarily 
mere contradiction of the testimony will not justify 
support. For example, if my witness testifies that 
the light was green and the other side testifies that 
the light was red, I cannot now put in evidence that 
my person is an honest person. I may not, because 
contradiction is not an attack on credibility. However, 
there are cases in which contradiction so carries the 
implication of dishonesty that a court will call it 
an attack on credibility and allow rehabilitation. 
Suppose, for example, that Witness A states that he saw 
defendant shoot the victim. Witness B, testifying for 
the defense, states that he was with Witness A on that 
day and that the two of them arrived at the scene after 
the victim was already dead. That is a contradiction, 
of course, but it is also susceptible to no other inter-
pretation but that B is calling A a liar. Accordingly, 
the cases tend to allow supportive, rehabil it at ing 
testimony for Witness A to show that he has a good 
reputation for truthfulness. 
MRE 608(b) governs proof of specific instances of 
bad conduct as bearing on credibility. The theory is 
still the same: If a person is not a truthful person on 
some occasions, he is less likely to be truthful this 
time. To speak of a person's general reputation is 
quite different from inquiring into specific incidents 
in a person's life when he may have been dishonest. 
The second sentence of 608(b) allows questions about 
specific instances of conduct bearing on truthfulness. 
For example, if I have some information that the 
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witness filed a false income tax statement last year, 
I may ask about it. But then, as provided in the first 
sentence of 608(b), I must take the answer that I get. 
If he denies it, I may not pursue the matter. The court 
should not allow fishing expeditions, but rather should 
require some showing at side bar that there is·a good-
faith basis for asking the question. 
Until recently, there was a question in the Michigan 
cases whether incidents inquired about had to bear on 
honesty. Some cases in Michigan had held admissible 
inquiry into misconduct showing that the witness was 
not a moral person, without reference to honesty or 
truthfulness as such. But People v Bouchee, 400 Mich 
253; 253 NW2d 626 (1977), held that such inquiries 
are limited to events that reflect on truthfulness. 
In Bouchee the prosecutor sought to show that the 
defendant who had testified had four children but was 
not married. The Court said that having illegitimate 
children is not relevant to honesty and that the 
inquiry was therefore improper. MRE 608(b) underlines 
the point. 
The second paragraph of 608(b) provides that a 
witness properly may assert a privilege against self-
incrimination when being examined as to credibility. 
This issue was previously unclear in Michigan law. 
For example, if a witness is asked about a specific 
instance of dishonest conduct under 608(b) (such as 
"Did you cheat on your tax return?") and the question 
bears only on credibility and not on the facts of the 
case, the witness has not waived his privilege against 
self-incrimination by-;egtifying thus far. Therefore, 
he may refuse to answer the question if it is an other-
wise appropriate claim of the privilege. 
Let us turn now to the single most controversial 
provision of all of these rules, MRE 609, which deals 
with impeachment by showing a criminal conviction. When 
Federal Rule 609 went through the Supreme Court of the 
United States and then Congress, it generated more 
commentary and more heat-not necessarily more light-
than any other single provision of the entire Federal 
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Rules of Evidence. When it came to the Michigan commit-
tee, it evoked more hours of discussion than any other 
rule. Every time the rule has been drafted, whether by 
the Supreme Court committee, Congress, the House, the 
Senate, the Michigan committee, or the Michigan Supreme 
Court, it has been a compromise. The emotional nature 
of the issues involved seems to demand a compromise, 
and therefore no formulation of this rule is ever 
totally acceptable to anyone. 
The relevance of a conviction to credibility depends 
upon the nature of the crime. If a conviction is for 
an act of dishonesty, for example perjury, filing a 
false income tax return, or embezzlement, the desired 
inference is that the witness has been dishonest before 
and it is likely that he is being dishonest now. This 
rule resembles Rule 608(b), which authorizes inquiry 
about specific instances bearing on truthfulness. 
Under Rule 608(b), a lawyer cannot prove such instances 
if denied; but under Rule 609 not only can he ask about 
them, he can prove them. This is because, being of 
record, the convict ion can be proved economically. 
The witness probably will concede it, especially if 
the record is in court; and if he won't concede it, 
the record can be offered. The process of weighing 
relevance against time, side issues, etc., is no 
different from what it was under Rule 608(b); the 
result is often different because not much time is 
required and the conviction was of course based on a 
finding beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In addition, even if the offense does not involve 
dishonesty, conviction of a crime indicates that the 
witness is not law-abiding, is not a very moral per-
son, or is a person who sometimes takes his obligations 
to society 1 ight ly and therefore may be thought to take 
his obligation to tell the truth in the courtroom a 
little lightly also. 
Rule 609 uses an amalgam of these ideas to define 
the grounds of impeachment provided that the crime 
was serious. Under Rule 609(a)(l), the crime used for 
impeachment must be punishable by death or imprisonment 
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in excess of one year, or it must involve theft, dis-
honesty, or false statement, regardless of the punish-
ment. For example, a homicide conviction is admissible 
to impeach even though the crime involved no dishonesty 
or theft, and a shoplifting conviction, at the level of 
a mere misdemeanor, is admissible because it is a crime 
involving theft. (Incidentally, the word "theft" was 
an insertion by the Michigan Supreme Court. The federal 
rule simply says "dishonesty or false statement." 
The Michigan Court clarified whether theft involves 
dishonesty.) 
Though the conviction meets the test of Rule 
609(a)(l) as a felony and/or a crime of dishonesty, 
under Rule 609( a) (2) it cannot be used to impeach 
when the court determines that the probative value in 
admitting this evidence on the issue of cred ib il ity 
outweighs its prejudicial effect. The burden is on the 
proponent-unlike the burden under Rule 403. Value on 
the issue of credibility is measured against the danger 
that the evidence will be misused by the fact finder. 
Prejudice is obviously going to be greater when the 
impeached witness is a party, and especially the 
accused party in a criminal case. The convictions will 
be especially damning and prejudicial if the prior 
crime was the same kind of offense as that charged in 
the instant case. This is an obvious time for a motion 
in limine, under Rule 103(c), in order that defense 
counsel may determine whether to place his client with 
a record on the stand. 
Rule 609(b) creates a ten-year "statute of limita-
tions" on convictions counting usually from the time 
the person was released from prison. The federal rule 
gives the court some discretion to allow an older 
conviction; the Michigan rule does not. 
MRE 609(c) excludes proof of a conviction if there 
has been a pardon, annulment, or the like. 
A Michigan statute purports to make juvenile adjudi-
cations inadmissible for any purpose. MCLA 712A.23; 
MSA 27.3178 (598.23). Rule 609(d), which supersedes the 
statute, preserves that inadmissibility against the 
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accused himself. However, it permits use of juvenile 
adjudications for other witnesses if it would be 
admissible to attack the credibility of an adult, that 
is, if it meets the tests of 609(a) and (b) and if the 
court is satisfied that admission is necessary for a 
fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. 
The rule is responsive to the constitutional concerns 
expressed in Davis v Alaska, 415 US 308 (1974), 
suggesting that due process requires that the defendant 
be given an opportunity to confront the witnesses 
against him and to explore their credibility. 
Under 609(e), though the case is on appeal, the 
conviction is still admissible, but the party appealing 
can testify to prove that there is an appeal. 
Rule 610 prohibits proof of religious beliefs or 
opinions to impair or enhance credibility. Not prohib-
ited, however, is evidence of religious affiliations 
which have a bearing on bias or interest. For example, 
suppose there is a will contest case in which Mrs. Jones 
has died and left her estate to the First Baptist 
Church. Her grandchildren attack the will on the ground 
that she was not competent to make a will. Testifying 
in support of the will is Mr. Johnson, an active member 
of the First Baptist Church. Surely, such membership 
bearing on bias can be shown. 
Rule 707, though not in the "Witnesses" Article, 
deals with impeachment of expert witnesses by use of 
learned treatises. In the federal rules and in the 
proposed Michigan rules, this provision without the 
last six words was exception 18 of Hearsay Exception 
Rule 803. It made learned treatises admissible as 
substantive evidence. The Michigan Supreme Court 
preferred the traditional approach, limiting the use of 
treatises to impeachment purposes only. Hence Michigan 
Rule 707. If the expert relied on a book on direct 
examination, it can be used for impeachment on cross-
examination. If he did not mention the book on direct, 
it may be called to his attention on cross. 
The other requirement of MRE 707 is that the work 
from which the cross-examiner wishes to read "be 
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established as a reliable authority by the testimony or 
admission of the witness or by other expert testimony 
or by judicial not ice • • • • " 
Q. Is this an authority? 
A. Yes, it is. 
That would establish authority, as would another 
witness's earlier testimony that the treatise is an 
authority or the court's judicial notice of the work's 
status. Then if the expert referred to it on direct or 
if it was called to his attention on cross, it may be 
used to impeach him; but the passages read are not 
substantive evidence. 
